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Abstract
We utilize a new policy adoption database with over 500 policies to test whether the initiative
process influences the timing of policy adoption. Prior studies have produced both supportive
and null findings of the effect of the initiative, but typically examine policies one policy or a single
composite score at a time. Theoretical accounts suggest that the initiative process should have
heterogeneous effects on policy outcomes depending on the configuration of public and government preferences. By pooling hundreds of policies we are able to estimate the average effect of
the initiative process on state policy adoption more systematically while also evaluating variation
in its effect. We find via a pooled event history analysis that the initiative tends to increase
innovativeness, but that this effect can be cancelled out by signature and distribution requirements. We find that this effect varies substantially across policies and is more consistently
positive on average in states more liberal populations. We also find evidence that the initiative
process moderates the effect of ideology on policy adoption, while making the adoption of nonideological policies more likely on average.
Keywords: initiative; innovation; diffusion; policy; state politics

Does the initiative process influence the extent to which states innovate by adopting
new policies? The initiative process has been theorized to act as a “gun behind the
door,” pushing legislatures to adopt policies closer to median citizen preferences
(Gerber 1996; Matsusaka 2004), thereby encouraging the legislature to be more
responsive to public opinion. Historically, scholars have evaluated the effect of the
initiative within a single policy by determining whether policy outcomes in initiative
states appear to hew closer to public opinion. This single policy approach has led to
disparate camps of findings with some arguing that the initiative has an effect on state
policies (Matsusaka 2018b) and others arguing it has no effect (Lax and Phillips
2012). This paper seeks to fill that gap by systematically reviewing the theoretical
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predictions for the influence of the initiative process on policy change and evaluating
them in the context of state policy adoption within a sample of hundreds of policies.
This broad approach allows us to focus on the heterogeneous nature of the predicted
relationship: for some policies, the initiative will increase the chance of adoption and
for others it will decrease it.
Theoretical arguments and recent work underscore that the initiative process can
be a driver of both policy change and policy stasis. That is, it can lead to policy change
either directly via the ballot or indirectly through legislative moderation or it can slow
policy change by providing a brake on legislative attempts to change policy in a way
that gets ahead of public opinion. Yet few studies attempt to assess or catalog these
differing influences. In fact, we know of no study that systematically analyzes the full
range of effects of the initiative on policy change, although Matsusaka (2018a) comes
the closest by reviewing the findings of multiple studies.
To cover this range of possible effects, and in contrast to previous studies that often
used one policy, and at most a few dozen, we use the new State Policy Innovation and
Diffusion (SPID) database (Boehmke et al. 2018) that incorporates hundreds of
policies. Evaluating the effect of the initiative with so many policies offers three
primary advantages. First, we avoid the idiosyncrasies inherent in single-policy
studies. Second, using so many policies greatly increases our power to detect a
possibly small but consistent average effect that might exist but be difficult to pin
down with only one policy. Third, analyzing data from hundreds of policies with
pooled event history analysis (PEHA) allows us to capture the theoretically expected
heterogeneous effect of the initiative across policies either by employing random
coefficients or by subsample analysis for clusters of policies.
We find consistent evidence of an average effect on the order of a one percentage
point increase in the probability of adopting a new policy. This effect decreases from a
little over 1.5 percentage points for states with modest signature requirements to nearly
zero for those with very large signature requirements or a distribution requirement.
Moreover, we find heterogeneity in the direction of the effect across groups of policies
based on a general measure of citizen preferences. On a policy-by-policy basis, we find
that for the majority of policies states with the initiative process are neither more nor
less likely to adopt the policy. Yet when we group the policies by their ideological
direction—that is, does ideology matter and if so in what direction—we find that the
initiative consistently increases the chance of adoption for ideologically neutral policies.
For more ideologically oriented policies, we find symmetric effects based on the
direction of influence: the initiative increases the chance of adoption when the baseline
chance of adoption is low but decreases the chance of adoption at the other extreme.

Theories of the Initiative Process and Policy Outcomes
The initiative process has been shown to have a wide variety of effects on state politics
and policy and has been the source of considerable research outlining theories as to
how and why the initiative alters state politics (Matsusaka 2018a). Such theories
typically rely on game-theoretic models of the state policy-making process. These
models build on Romer and Rosenthal’s (1979) setter model by allowing initiative
proponents, typically organized interest groups, to select any policy to challenge the
status quo via election. Gerber (1996) sets forth such a model with a one-dimensional
policy space and three actors: the median Legislator, the initiative Proponent, and the
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median Voter. In states without the initiative process, the legislature chooses policy;
in initiative states that policy can be challenged by an initiative subject to a cost.
Subsequent models consider variations on the basic assumptions by adding uncertainty over voter preference (Matsusaka 2001) or by accounting for pivotal actors in
government (Boehmke, Osborn, and Schilling 2015).
These models generally conclude that the presence of the initiative process produces
policy outcomes no further from the median voter’s ideal point than expected without the
initiative and sometimes closer.1 Whether it does so depends on the location of players’
ideal points, the cost of proposing an initiative, and the availability of an individual or
group to support those efforts. Collecting signatures and campaigning for an initiative is
costly, so initiatives should only be proposed under the right conditions. If there is not a
threat of an initiative being proposed, then the initiative process is unlikely to have an
effect on the status quo. Typically the threat increases as policies deviate further from
voters’ preferences and as the cost of proposing an initiative decreases.
Models of the initiative identify legislative policy moderation as the primary
mechanism for policy influence. Known as the indirect effect of the initiative process,
legislative moderation occurs when the legislature passes a policy closer to voters than
it otherwise would to avoid triggering an initiative proposal. In contrast, the direct
effect occurs when the legislature does not completely deter a ballot measure that
ultimately passes.2 Through either mechanism, however, the moderating effect of the
initiative produces greater congruence between policy outcomes and the median
voter’s preference. Importantly, the prediction of enhanced congruence does not
mean that policy in initiative states will move in any particular direction. Moderation
could mean moving policy leftwards or rightwards toward voters depending on the
relative location of actors’ ideal points in the policy space.
These predictions persist in models that focus on a binary policy space. This special
case has received attention since tests of the effect of the initiative process often occur
with binary policy data, for example, does a state adopt a lottery or not? since many
policies are difficult to place precisely in a continuous space. Boehmke (2005) focuses
on the question of policy adoption when the legislature prefers the status quo of not
adopting and finds that the chance of policy adoption increases with the probability
that voters prefer the change and decreases with the cost of proposing an initiative.
Leemann and Wasserfallen (2016) expand on this by exploring the case in which the
legislature prefers adoption as well as when it does not. They confirm the findings from
the continuous policy models that the presence of the initiative increases policy
congruence and that this tendency increases as initiatives become less costly.
Table 1 presents a summary of the four relevant scenarios in the binary policy
context.3 Consistent with Leemann and Wasserfallen (2016), when voter and legislative preferences coincide the ability to propose initiatives will not affect policy
outcomes. But, when they differ, the initiative will matter. When voters want to adopt
1
See Matsusaka (2018a) for a broad summary of models of the initiative process and related mechanisms
like the referendum.
2
While ballot measures do not occur in Gerber’s (1996) original model, subsequent work shows they may
happen via uncertainty about voters (Matsusaka 2001) or legislative gridlock (Boehmke, Osborn, and
Schilling 2015).
3
We summarize the effect in terms of policy adoption rather than on policy congruence to highlight the
range of effects the initiative might have on adoption. This treats the status quo as zero, which is where it starts
in the Event History Analysis (EHA) modeling approach, and asks whether policy moves or not.
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Table 1. Summary of predictions across combinations of voter and legislature preferences
Voter’s preference

Legislature’s
Preference

0
1

0

1

No influence
Decreases Pr (adopt)

Increases Pr (adopt)
No influence

and the legislature does not, the initiative provides a motivation for the legislature to
move policy, or a means for voters to do so when it does not. When the legislature
wants to adopt the policy, but voters do not the former could move policy with no
hesitation in noninitiative states, but in initiative states the legislature knows that its
decision could be subsequently reversed by voters. In a world of costless legislating
this might not concern it, but if producing legislation is costly—whether on its own
terms or in the opportunity cost of not revising other policies—then this threat of
reversal may deter the legislature from acting. These predictions can be interpreted
probabilistically since in both of the previously described models the location of
voters is not known with certainty. Thus, as the probability that voters prefer a move
from zero to one increases the presence of the initiative process makes such a move
more likely. In contrast, as the probability that voters prefer a policy change decreases
the initiative will lead to a small chance of policy adoption.
In sum then, despite a consistent effect on congruence the initiative process can have
multiple effects on adoption depending on the configuration of preferences and the
costs of proposal. In some cases, it can promote adoption, in other cases, it can slow or
halt adoption, and in yet other cases, it will have no effect. We emphasize adoption
because empirical tests often rely on binary policy adoption data and many of these have
merely tested whether the initiative increases the chance of adoption (e.g., Boehmke
2005; Gerber 1996; Schildkraut 2001). While this may be appropriate for a given policy
and preference configuration, it does not capture the full range of the possible effects of
the initiative process on state policy adoption. We seek to address that by modeling the
adoption of over 500 policies in order to evaluate the full range of initiative effects and
the relative frequency of each. But, first, we review the literature conducting empirical
evaluations of the influence of the initiative process on policy outcomes.

Policy Specific Findings
The effects of the initiative have been tested in a variety of contexts and many studies
have found that the initiative influences state policy outcomes. Researchers have found
that states with the initiative process are more likely to have restrictive abortion laws
(Arcenaux 2002; Burden 2005; Gerber 1996, 1999), ban same-sex marriage (HaiderMarkel, Querze, and Lindman 2007; Hume 2011; Lewis 2011; Lupia et al. 2010), and
allow the death penalty (Boehmke 2005; Gerber 1999). The initiative makes states
much more likely to adopt term limits in both the legislature (Bowler and Donovan
2004; Bowler, Donovan, and Tolbert 1998) and the executive branch (Matsusaka 2008).
Initiative states tend to be more reliant on fees rather than taxes for spending
(Matsusaka 1995, 2004), which may be related to initiative states being more permissive
of lotteries (Jensen 2003) and tribal gaming (Boehmke 2005). In his comprehensive
survey of research on direct democracy, Matsusaka (2018a) argues that the literature
over the past few decades has found that initiative states tend to have lower spending
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and taxation levels, more conservative social policies, and are more likely to have
policies congruent with public preferences. These effects are not constant: in earlier
eras, the initiative process increased spending levels in the states (Matsusaka 2004).
At the same time, a second group of studies finds the initiative has no effect on
policy outcomes. Early research on fiscal policy finds that states with the initiative
process do not differ in state spending and taxation levels compared to noninitiative
states (Camobreco 1998; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996). More recently, scholars
have evaluated the initiative’s influence on policy liberalism to move beyond policy
specific findings and evaluate whether the initiative changes state policies in the
aggregate. Using this approach, Monogan, Gray, and Lowery (2009) find no evidence
that the initiative moves policy liberalism closer to public preferences. Caughey and
Warshaw (2017) use a similar approach and find that the initiative does not alter
responsiveness when measured from an aggregate, policy-liberalism perspective. A
null relationship is also found at the municipal level (Tausanovitch and Warshaw
2014). Others have critiqued this approach because measures of the public and policy
are not typically on the same scale, so researchers cannot know the relative location of
actors and identify the initiative’s conditional effect (Matsusaka 2001, 2018a).
Scholars can identify differences in policy outcomes between initiative and not states
using continuous measures, but will not be able to identify the extent to which policy
is moving closer (or farther) to public preferences without policy and opinion being
on the same scale. Additionally, if the initiative makes policies more liberal in some
states, but more conservative in others, scholars may misidentify the initiative as
having no effect on policy, when in fact it has counterbalancing effects.
Others have tried to address some of the concerns examining responsiveness in
general by developing measures of pubic opinion on specific policies to evaluate
whether policies are congruent with opinion. Rather than using a continuous
measure of the relative location of actors, scholars measure whether policy is aligned
with the majority public opinion. Lax and Phillips (2009) first focus on gay rights and
then expand to multiple policy areas (Lax and Phillips 2012) and find no relationship
between the initiative process and policy congruence. Matsusaka (2010), on the other
hand, finds higher rates of policy congruence in initiative states on 10 policy issues.
Matsusaka (2018a) examines the divergent findings through a replication of Lax and
Phillips’s (2012) results and finds that initiative states have higher levels of congruence on some issue areas, but not others.
Since the theoretical literature on direct democracy indicates that its effects
depend on the institutional and political environment, these differences in findings
may simply reflect this expected heterogeneity. The diffusion of recreational marijuana began with high-profile ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington. In
contrast, Vermont is currently the only noninitiative state to adopt recreational
marijuana as of 2019 (NCSL 2019). This examples illustrates how the initiative
process can push states to adopt a new policy when public opinion favors it, but
the legislature remains cautious. In contrast, initiatives and popular referendum can
also be used to block policy change, as activists have successfully demonstrated in
recent years for labor policies. In 2011, voters supported a popular veto referendum
on SB 5 in Ohio in 2011 and then again in 2018 with Prop A in Missouri.4 In both
4
https://www.sos.state.oh.us/elections/election-results-and-data/2011-elections-results/state-issue-2-novem
ber-8-2011/ and https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/petitions/2018BallotMeasures, respectively. Interestingly,
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cases, voters collected signatures to override the state government and prevent new
policies reforming collective bargaining and right to work legislation, respectively.
These successful measures sent strong signals to elites that they were out of step with
voters on labor laws. On both medical recreational marijuana and labor laws, the
elites were out of step with public opinion. For the case of marijuana legislation, the
initiative made states more likely to adopt a policy, whereas in the case of labor laws,
the initiative prevented elites from moving the status quo. While these examples
highlight the potential for the initiative to have heterogeneous effects, evaluating the
effect of the initiative process requires calculating its effects across a wide range of
policies. Yet, despite the rich tradition of research in direct democracy, to our
knowledge, no study has tested the effect of ballot initiatives on a large number of
policies. Only a few studies (Lax and Phillips 2012; Matsusaka 2010) use more than a
handful of policies to test the policy effects of direct democracy. A systematic study of
hundreds of policies can allow us to identify the average effect of ballot initiatives on
policy innovation, and the measure the heterogeneous effect of the initiative process
in a single, unified sample.

Policy Database and Pooled Event History Analysis
To identify the heterogeneous effect of the initiative process across a large sample of
policies, we draw on the SPID database (Boehmke et al. 2018). SPID records state
policy adoptions over the last 200 years for over 700 policies and has broad and fairly
representative coverage of policy topic areas including criminal justice, health,
education, commerce, and civil rights (Boehmke et al. 2019). It incorporates policies
that have widely diffused to all 50 states as well as policies that have only diffused to a
few states. SPID therefore provides a systematic set of policies with which to evaluate
the relationship between the initiative process and policy adoption. Given limitations
arising from our control variables, we restrict our analysis to observations between
1972 and 2014, resulting in 546 policies and 12,164 policy adoptions across the 50 US
states.5 To our knowledge, this is roughly 10 times larger than the current largest
multiple-policy analysis of the initiative’s effect (Lax and Phillips 2012).
The literature on policy adoption and diffusion has employed Event History
Analysis (EHA) for nearly three decades since Berry and Berry (1990) applied it to
study the adoption of state lotteries. It is appropriate for examining the binary
decision of whether to adopt or not to adopt a policy (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004). Failing to incorporate the timing of policy change into models evaluating the
effect of the initiative process (or any other factors) risks drawing faulty conclusions.
For example, if initiative states adopt a given policy more quickly than other states,
cross-sectional analyses done early on will find a large effect, whereas those done later
will find a smaller effect, if any, as more noninitiative states adopt. Further, failing to
Missouri highlights the potential heterogeneity of the initiative because conservative activists are now
working to place an initiative for Right to Work on the ballot in November 2020. If successful, then popular
referendums and initiatives would block policy change in 2018 then force policy change in 2020.
5
The number of adoptions in the remaining policies ranges from 2 to 50. We include any policy that starts
diffusing in 1972 as well as policies that started before 1972 if they have at least 20 observations from 1972 on
and at least one adoption each by initiative and non-initiative states. Models were also estimated using only
policies that began diffusion in 1972 or later.
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account for how the initiative and other covariates change over time can lead to
misattribution of effects. The literature on the effect of the initiative has often employed
such cross-sectional approaches (e.g., Gerber 1999; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996),
but some studies have utilized EHA (Boehmke 2005; Schildkraut 2001).
EHA was designed to study the timing of adoption of a single event, but our analysis
of the SPID data includes hundreds of policies. In order to account for differences in the
determinants of adoption across these polices, especially for the initiative process, we
turn to a recent variant of EHA, PEHA. PEHA joins multiple policies into one model to
leverage the common features of adoption across policies while also providing opportunities to capture heterogeneity across policies (Kreitzer and Boehmke 2016). Casting
PEHA as a multilevel model offers a variety of ways to account for heterogeneity across
policies or states. Of most interest here, differences across policies can be permitted by
random or fixed effects, random coefficients, or with explicit interactions (Kreitzer and
Boehmke 2016). In contrast to standard EHA models, the unit of analysis is statepolicy-year, so the dependent variable is the probability a state adopts a particular
policy in a given year (adoption is a binary indicator). Similar to standard EHA, a policy
does not enter the dataset until the first state adoption of that policy. Once this occurs,
all nonadopting states enter the risk set and with the adoption variable coded zero until
the year they adopt the policy. After adoption, all future state-policy-year observations
are dropped as the state is no longer at risk of adopting the policy.
Our analysis of the data proceeds in three steps corresponding to increasingly
heterogeneous PEHA specifications. Our first models assume a consistent, homogeneous effect of the initiative process across policies. This allows us to recover an
estimate of the average effect across policies: does the initiative generally tend to
increase, decrease, or not influence the rate of policy adoption? This effect is of interest
since it captures the overall net effect of the initiative process. Since theoretical accounts
suggest a heterogeneous effect, we then allow the effect of the initiative to vary
randomly across policies via a random coefficient. With this specification, we can
identify the average effect of the initiative across hundreds of policies as well as the
variation of this effect across policies. These quantities allow us to explicitly test for
heterogeneity and then examine the estimated distribution to determine its range
across policies. Finally, we allow the effect of the initiative process to vary with voter
ideology. We do so both with separate EHA models and via a PEHA model that allows
for three distinct effects of the initiative-ideology interaction: one for policies favored by
conservative states, one for those favored by liberal states, and one for policies with no
apparent ideological appeal. We do this to determine whether the initiative merely
changes the average baseline chance of adoption or whether it enhances the effect of
public opinion. A single interaction across all policies would tend to average out such
differences if they depend on the ideological appeal of a given policy.
Our primary variable for testing these effects is a binary indicator that distinguishes
between initiative and noninitiative states,6 but we include additional variables to
account for differences in the initiative process across states. To test the modifying
effects of the costs of qualifying and passing a measure, we include the signature
requirement for qualification and an indicator for geographic distribution

6

In our reported specifications we include Illinois as an initiative state. Given how restrictive and rarely
used its process is, we have also run models treating Illinois as a non-initiative state. The results and
conclusions are almost identical.
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requirements, both taken from the Book of the States. The signature requirements
variable is an average of the constitutional and statutory initiative signature requirements, if states permit both. The lower the signature requirements, the easier it is for
proponents to place an initiative on the ballot, making the threat of initiatives stronger
and more credible. We expect the effect of signatures and distribution requirements to
work in the opposite direction of the binary initiative indicator: a positive indicator
should match with a negative effect of these cost variables that reduces the former
toward zero. We include these institutional features themselves rather than a measure
of the number of ballot items since we want to test both the direct and indirect effects of
the initiative on policy. Since the indirect effect operates without producing ballot
measures, we would not capture it by counting ballot items.7
We also include a series of controls common in the policy adoption literature.
These fall into two categories: internal and external determinants. Internal determinants typically seek to capture the presence of resources that allow states to explore
and adopt new policies (Berry and Berry 1990) as well as policy-specific measures of
policy demand or need. Given our wide range of policies, we focus on variables related
to resources and need such as total population, state income per capita, unified party
control, and both dimensions of legislative professionalism from Bowen and Greene
(Bowen and Greene 2014). The first dimension of legislative professionalism is
similar to Squire’s (2007) index of legislative professionalism and high levels are
associated with high salaries. The second dimension captures differences among
professionalized legislatures with high values indicating an emphasis on legislator
resources (such as staff) and low values indicating professionalized states with
relatively long legislative sessions. We also include measures of change in population
and change in income to capture that quickly growing state may be more innovative
to adapt to changing economic and social conditions. We also include a measure of
change in party control of a state as an incoming party may try to implement a new
policy agenda to reflect their partisan preferences. To capture public ideology, we use
Caughey and Warshaw’s (2018) measure of citizen social policy liberalism.8 The
measure of public liberalism was generated from over 1.5 million survey responses on
hundreds of topic areas to create dynamic state-year estimates for the entire time
period. Since we expect ideology to have differing effects across policies (even when
not incorporated into the effect of the initiative process) we follow Kreitzer and
Boehmke (2016) by including a random coefficient for ideology. Lastly, we include a
measure for unified control of state governments to account for the potential
advantage of single-party control for moving the policy status quo (Klarner 2013).
Studies of policy diffusion have long acknowledged that states look to each other
when determining what legislation to pass (Walker 1969). While not the focus of this
study, we want to control for such forces in explaining adoption in order to estimate
the effect of the initiative process. Policy diffusion scholars have identified geographic
contiguity as a strong proxy for the social learning and economic competition forces
that underlie diffusion (Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney 2001; Walker 1969). Since
initiative states exhibit positive spatial clustering, we want to rule out diffusion via
contiguity as a cause of changes in adoption timing in initiative states. However,
7
And, as we show in our supplemental materials, even if we do add frequency of use into our models it does
not matter above and beyond the institutional features already accounted for.
8
We estimated models using both social and economic liberalism. Both measures produced the similar
conclusions. We choose social liberalism because it represented more observations in our data (60%).
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recent research finds that contiguity is an insufficient measure for representing all ties
between states and identifies a broader latent diffusion network that reflects state
political and demographic similarity more so than contiguity (Desmarais, Harden,
and Boehmke 2015). As with contiguity, we measure the influence of these persistent
diffusion ties with a count of adoptions by connected states. Following Boehmke et al.
(2017), we apply the decay parameter implied by the latent network estimates such
that recent adoptions by a state’s sources matter more than preceding adoptions.
In addition to these substantive and theoretically-motivated variables, we include
additional controls for time and policy differences. We account for time trends in two
ways: an overall time effect via year fixed effects and duration dependence with a cubic
polynomial of the duration for which a state has been at risk of adopting a policy. We
initially model policy differences through random effects before moving to fixed effect
specifications, which make it easier to model and interpret heterogeneity in the effect of
the interaction between the initiative and ideology across policies. In contrast to the
fixed effects specifications, random effects are assumed to be independent from the
included covariates and the policy-state-year errors, but we note that using fixed effects
for these initial models did not meaningfully change the results.9

Pooled Event History Analysis of Initiative’s Effect
Average Effect of the Initiative

Table 2 reports the results from our first series of PEHA models. All include random
coefficients by policy for citizen ideology to account for the different effect of ideology
across policies. The first two models capture the average effect of the initiative across
policy areas while the second two models account for heterogeneity in this effect
through a random coefficient for the initiative process indicator. The first model tests
our first two hypotheses with controls for the initiative process and the signature
requirement. The second model adds in the presence of a distribution requirement.
Both show positive and significant effects for the presence of the initiative process,
and negative and significant coefficients for the cost of proposal variables (we use α ¼
0:01 as our significance level for all tables). We run these models separately to
highlight the effect of the distribution requirement, which has been shown to greatly
affect initiative use but has rarely, if ever, been included in studies of the effect of the
initiative process on policy outcomes. We find a large and negative effect that reduces
much of the influence of the initiative. Further, adding this variable increases the
coefficient for the initiative process since it now captures its influence among states
without distribution requirements. We interpret these results substantively in a
moment, but first note that the control variables largely perform as expected, with
internal variables measuring change in population and a new party taking control
increasing the probability of adoption and those for external forces indicating
positive and significant state-to-state diffusion.10
9
We attempted to implement a Hausman test to explicitly evaluate the suitability of random effects, but its
assumptions were not met (the standard errors of some of the coefficients in the fixed effects model were
smaller than those from the random effects model). Further, we also note that we had to run the fixed effects
model with indicator variables since the conditional logit version did not converge after 1000 iterations.
10
The notable exception for the controls is that legislative professionalism is negatively associated with
policy adoption. While unexpected, it should be noted that this finding is consistent with other pooled
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Table 2. Pooled event history analysis (PEHA) of the effect of the initiative process on policy adoption
Initiative process
Signatures—average

0.2087*
(0.0505)
0.0170*
(0.0055)

0.1416*
(0.0065)
0.1498*
(0.0095)
0.1530*
(0.0305)
0.0092
(0.0230)
0.0563
(0.0260)
0.0757*
(0.0216)
0.0258
(0.0129)
0.0148*
(0.0051)
0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0557
(0.0250)
2.8861*
(0.9461)
0.1032
(0.1367)
0.1711*
(0.0437)
2.9363*
(0.1913)

0.2684*
(0.0519)
0.0155*
(0.0055)
0.1399*
(0.0311)
0.1413*
(0.0065)
0.1503*
(0.0095)
0.1382*
(0.0307)
0.0084
(0.0230)
0.0360
(0.0264)
0.0827*
(0.0216)
0.0232
(0.0130)
0.0148*
(0.0051)
0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0566
(0.0250)
2.7680*
(0.9456)
0.1275
(0.1362)
0.1627*
(0.0437)
2.9313*
(0.1914)

1.2728*
(0.0925)
0.2206*
(0.0208)

1.2745*
(0.0926)
0.2222*
(0.0210)

0.0634
(0.0318)

0.0643
(0.0319)

311,999

311,999

Distribution requirements
Latent decay
Contiguity
Public liberalism
Unified control
Real income per capita
Legislative Prof—Dim 1
Legislative Prof—Dim 2
Duration
Duration squared
Duration cubed
Population
Change population
Change income
Change in party
Constant
Policy level random effects
Var (constant)
Var (βIdeology )
Var (βInitiative )
Cov (constant, βIdeology )
Cov (constant, βInitiative )
Cov (βIdeology , βInitiative )
Observations

0.0546
(0.0261)

0.1414*
(0.0065)
0.1481*
(0.0096)
0.1610*
(0.0303)
0.0000
(0.0230)
0.0601
(0.0260)
0.0795*
(0.0215)
0.0193
(0.0128)
0.0136*
(0.0051)
0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0685*
(0.0247)
2.7835*
(0.9466)
0.0954
(0.1372)
0.1669*
(0.0437)
2.9530*
(0.1912)

0.2663*
(0.0538)
0.0167*
(0.0055)
0.1430*
(0.0312)
0.1413*
(0.0065)
0.1481*
(0.0096)
0.1368*
(0.0307)
0.0059
(0.0231)
0.0385
(0.0265)
0.0830*
(0.0217)
0.0230
(0.0130)
0.0135*
(0.0051)
0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0580
(0.0251)
2.8251*
(0.9480)
0.1279
(0.1364)
0.1627*
(0.0438)
2.9231*
(0.1913)

1.2360*
(0.0939)
0.2204*
(0.0208)
0.0490*
(0.0163)
0.0480
(0.0319)
0.0390
(0.0298)
0.0286
(0.0132)
311,999

1.2386*
(0.0941)
0.2222*
(0.0210)
0.0519*
(0.0165)
0.0478
(0.0320)
0.0399
(0.0300)
0.0308
(0.0134)
311,999

Note: PEHA includes 594 policies with policies as the group level and fixed effects for year.
*p < 0.01.

diffusion models that have found either a null or negative effect of legislative professionalism in predicting
policy adoption (Bricker and LaCombe 2020; Mallinson 2021).
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Figure 1. Marginal effect of the initiative process by signature and distribution
requirements.
Note: Plot depicts the marginal effect of the initiative process on the latent scale of the
probability of adoption: b
βI þ b
βSigs  Sigs þ b
βDist  Dist. Shaded area represents a 95%
confidence interval. Bar plot depicts the joint distribution of signatures and distribution requirement.
Fully interpreting the influence of the initiative process requires accounting for the
multiple variables that measure its effect. To that end, Figure 1 plots the combined
effect of the initiative process across the range of signature requirements and for a
hypothetical state with and without a distribution requirement. The plot on the left
shows the effect on the latent variable scale and its 95% confidence interval for
nondistribution requirement states. This effect stays positive over all values of the
signature requirement variable and the confidence interval excludes zero up to a
requirement of about 14%. As the bar plot of the joint distribution of signature and
distribution requirements shows, nearly all of the state-year observations for these
states fall below 14%. The plot on the right conveys very different results. In states
with distribution requirements, the effect of the initiative process as a whole is
positive until signatures reach 8% but its 95% confidence interval only excludes zero
when signatures are either below one or above 13%.
While these results provide evidence that the initiative has a statistically significant
average effect across policies, we also want to evaluate the substantive effect of the
initiative process. To do so, we ran a series of predicted value and first difference
calculations based on the second model.11 These calculations put the probability of
adoption without the initiative process at 5.6% and the probability of adoption with a
5% signature requirement and no distribution requirement at 6.7%; that drops to
6.3% when we set signatures to 10%. Adding a distribution requirement leads to
corresponding probabilities of 5.8% and 5.4%, respectively. The latter results confirm
Figure 1’s indication of a reduction in the probability of adoption for the one in
10 initiative states with a distribution requirement and high signature requirements.
11
We calculated the effect of the initiative by varying signature requirements from 0% to 15% with and
without a distribution requirement (the maximum observed value in the data set). Other variables were set at
their median values of the estimated sample data and we set the year to 2012, which had a moderate coefficient
among the year indicators. We drew 1000 values of the parameters from their estimated distribution and then
for each value we further drew 300 draws of the random effects to account for the uncertainty of their variance
estimate. We then calculated the mean probability of adoption for each scenario.
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For the other 90% the first difference corresponds to a fairly sizable 10%–20%
increase relative the baseline in states without a distribution requirement. Additionally, this represents a single-year effect that will accumulate over successive years—as
well as across states via diffusion effects—so a modest gap in the first year grows to
become even more substantively important over multiple years measured by the
cumulative probability of adoption.
The next two models allow for heterogeneity in the estimated effect of the initiative
process across policies by estimating a random coefficient by policy for the initiative
indicator variable. This provides an estimate of the mean of the coefficient, but also
provides an estimate of how much this effect varies across policy areas; together, these
two parameters describe the distribution of the initiative’s effects across policies. As
before, the random coefficients are assumed to be independent from the included
covariates and errors; in a subsequent analysis we models these differences with fixed
effects. In the first specification we omit the signature and distribution requirement
variables to simplify interpretation of the random coefficient. In this and the next
model that includes them, the initiative continues to exhibit a positive coefficient. The
magnitude shrinks in the first model—this is as expected since the indicator has to
capture the average effect rather than the effect with a signature requirement of zero
and no distribution requirement. The variance component for the model with
signature and distribution requirements reveals a substantively and statistically
significant variation in the estimated coefficient across policies with a large effect
relative to the fixed coefficient. A 95% confidence interval for the distribution of the
initiative coefficient across policies ranges from 0.14 to 0.71 in the fourth model.
With considerable evidence that effect of the initiative differs from zero and varies
across policies, we want to take a moment to address the possible endogeneity of the
initiative process itself. Prior studies have, after all, examined the adoption of the
initiative process (Smith and Fridkin 2008) just as we study the adoption of other
polices. If innovative states adopt the initiative process as they do other policies, then
perhaps it is not the initiative process itself that affects policy adoption in our models,
but some other, unmeasured factor(s). The literature has not found an easy way to
address this problem given little variation in the presence of the initiative process within
states, but we identify some strategies relevant to our application. First, the vast
majority of initiative states added the process in the first quarter of the 20th century
whereas the data from our analysis comes 50–100 years later. We therefore suspect that
states have changed substantially over that time period and that innovativeness in the
early 1900s is unrelated to innovativeness half a century later. The data support this
intuition: the correlation in the SPID data between dynamic policy innovativeness and
its 50-year lag is 0.02. Second, if we account for innovativeness from the early 1900s in
our PEHA models it does not predict adoption nor does it change our findings about
the effect of the initiative process.12 Third, we also ran models that excluded combinations of the five initiative states that adopted after 1924. Except for some results for
the signatures variable, these models produced similar results to those reported here.13
12
We did this in two ways. First, we included SPID’s static innovativeness scores for all states for the period
1912–1958. Second, since this covers a broad time period, we used the raw SPID data to calculate average
dynamic innovativeness for initiative states in the 20 years prior to adopting the initiative process. Since noninitiative states have no such period we set this variable to zero for them.
13
The five states are AK, FL, IL, MS, and WY. Excluding combinations of these occasionally produced an
insignificant coefficient for signatures that was sometimes positive, in particular when we excluded WY,
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Initiative Heterogeneity Based on Ideology

Our next approach seeks to unpack the heterogeneity we observe in the effect of the
initiative across polices by focusing on how the initiative can moderate the effect of
ideology on policy adoption. As discussed earlier, the initiative has the potential to
increase ideological congruence between the public and state policy. While we do not
have measures of ideal points for all relevant actors, we can evaluate the effect of
ideology on the probability of adoption, and how the initiative may moderate that
effect. If a state’s policies are too conservative for the public, then the initiative should
strengthen the effect of public liberalism on the probability of adoption as it pushes
the state to become more in line with the public. Depending on the configuration of
preferences, the initiative has the potential to strengthen or weaken the effect of
ideology on policy adoption.
This conditional effect of the initiative is traditionally evaluated in the literature
with an interaction between the initiative process indicator and an included measure
of public preferences. When the initiative indicator differs from zero, this provides
evidence that initiative states adopt a policy at a greater or lower rate than noninitiative states. When the coefficient on the interaction differs from zero, this
provides evidence that the presence of the initiative process alters policy responsiveness. Since our analysis includes hundreds of policies, applying this approach would
almost surely not work: if the initiative leads to a greater adoption rate for liberal
states for some policies and for conservative states for other policies then the average
effect may be zero. We therefore need to adapt this approach for the PEHA context.
We do so in two ways. First, we mimic the results of separate EHA models by
estimating different coefficients for each policy for the initiative, ideology, and the
interaction of two. We do so by interacting these variables with a set of policy fixed
effects while including the same controls in Table 2. This allows us to evaluate the
policy-specific effects of the initiative, as well as the initiative’s potential moderating
effect on citizen ideology while still estimating a pooled model to understand the
initiative’s overall effect. Rather than reporting these results in detail, we summarize
them by focusing on the significance of the initiative process, which depends on both
the initiative process indicator and its interaction with ideology.14 We estimate the
marginal effect of the initiative at values of public social liberalism ranging from 2.5
(very conservative) to 3.5 (very liberal). This covers the range of values in our sample.
We then report for each value of ideology the proportion of policies for which the
marginal effect produces a positive or negative and significant estimate, with the
latter determined by its 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2 reports these proportions. The greater height of the dark gray bars
indicates that the effect tends to be significant and positive more often than negative
across the entire ideological spectrum, roughly three times as often. This comports
with the positive average effect found earlier. The figure also reveals that the direction
of the initiative’s influence varies considerably between liberal, moderate, and
conservative states: conservative states have more balanced positive and negative
shifts while moderate and liberal states exhibit a more consistently positive effect. Put
differently, this means that the initiative process tends to increase the probability of
which has a large signature requirement. In one case—excluding WY and the others but including FL—this
positive coefficient was significant, but it was not if we just omit WY or also omit FL.
14
See Supplemental Material for full specification and results.
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Figure 2. Proportion of policies with significant estimated effects of the initiative
by social policy liberalism and sign of the effect.
Note: Results indicate the proportion of policies for which the 95% confidence
interval of the linear combination of the initiative process and its interaction with
citizen ideology excludes zero. Positive coefficients indicate that the chance of
adoption increases with citizen ideology; negative coefficients indicate it decreases
with citizen ideology.
adoption for any value of ideology but that when it does deter policy change it does so
disproportionately among conservative states. The final bar reports the proportion of
policies that produce a significant effect for at least one of the six values of ideology. A
positive effect occurs in nearly 13% of policies and a negative effect occurs in nearly
4%, indicating that the initiative influences the adoption of almost one in five policies.
Our second approach seeks a middle ground between the policy-by-policy interactions above and the standard ideology-initiative interaction used in single-policy
EHA studies. As we discussed earlier, including a single interaction in our PEHA
model would likely obscure evidence of a conditional effect given the underlying
heterogeneity across policies. But we can use the results from our policy-by-policy
interactions to identify different categories of effects and then pool within them but
not across them. We then evaluate whether the initiative conditions the relationship
between ideology and policy within these categories. This allows us to continue to
leverage our large sample of policies to more precisely estimate these heterogeneous
effects while still capturing fundamental differences in the effect across groups of policies.
The literature suggests that the initiative enhances responsiveness. We therefore
group policies based on the directional effect of ideology. To determine the direction
of this effect, we use our previous set of models, which produce distinct coefficients
for the influence of ideology on adoption for each policy. We group policies by the
sign and magnitude of the coefficient for noninitiative states since it excludes the
additional effect of the initiative process that we want to examine. Our groupings
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Table 3. Pooled event history analysis (PEHA) of the effect of the initiative process by the ideological
direction of policies.
Negative
Negative  initiative process
Negative  social policy liberalism
Negative  initiative  policy liberalism
Near zero
Near zero  initiative process
Near zero  social policy liberalism
Near zero  initiative  policy liberalism
Positive
Positive  initiative process
Positive  social policy liberalism
Positive  initiative  policy liberalism
Latent decay
Contiguity
Population
Unified control
Real income per capita
Legislative Prof—Dim 1
Legislative Prof—Dim 2
Duration
Duration squared
Duration cubed
Policy level random effects
Var (constant)
Observations

3.4287*
0.0947
0.5207*
0.2556*
3.1405*
0.0830
0.0092
0.0096
3.3715*
0.1058*
0.6587*
0.1180*
0.1336*
0.1422*
0.1066*
0.0206
0.0551
0.0831*
0.0257
0.0260*
0.0004*
0.0000*

(0.127)
(0.045)
(0.0415)
(0.049)
(0.116)
(0.034)
(0.026)
(0.031)
(0.110)
(0.034)
(0.028)
(0.031)
(0.006)
(0.009)
(0.018)
(0.021)
(0.024)
(0.019)
(0.012)
(0.005)
(0.000)
(0.000)

0.895*

(0.0676)
279,782

Note: Pooled event history analysis includes 438 policies with policies as the group level and fixed effects for year.
*p < 0.01.

capture whether the coefficient indicates that more liberal states prefer the policy
(b
β≥0:25), whether conservative states prefer the policy (b
β≤  0:25) or whether the
state ideology has little or nor effect on adoption (0:25 < b
β < 0:25).15 We then
estimate a PEHA model that estimates differences in the baseline probability of
adoption and separate effects of ideology within these three groupings. We similarly
include separate effects of the initiative process and its interaction with ideology for
all three groupings. This allows us to capture the underlying ideological appeal of a
policy and to determine whether the initiative process has distinct effects based on
that appeal.
Table 3 reports this results, but they are best interpreted graphically given the
many interactions. Figure 3 therefore shows the predicted probabilities and 95%
confidence intervals of policy adoption for initiative and noninitiative states across all
three policy categories: conservatism increases the baseline probability of adoption in
the left panel while liberalism increases it in the right panel; citizen ideology has no
effect in the middle panel. Below these probabilities, we also plot the density of
ideology within the subset of observations contained by each grouping. We shade
these densities by whether the 95% confidence interval of the effect of the initiative
given ideology excludes zero.16
15

This places 41% policies in the positive category, 34% in the near-zero, and 25% in the negative category.
We calculate the predicted probabilities using the margins command in Stata, which sets the random
effect to zero and other variables to their mean values. Significance is based on the underlying coefficients in
the latent variable scale: b
βInit þ b
βInit∗Ideo  Ideology.
16
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Figure 3. Effect of the initiative process on the probability of adoption by the
ideological effect of policies.
Note: Results show the probability of adoption for a hypothetical initiative state and
its counterfactual probability of adoption without the initiative process. Predicted
probabilities and confidence intervals calculated using the margins command in
Stata, which sets the random effects to zero. Other variables set to their median
values. Regions for which the marginal effect of the initiative process achieves
significance at the 0.05 level or better correspond to the black shaded regions of the
kernel density plot. Kernel density plots represent the distribution of ideology within
the estimation sample for the subset of policies coded into each of the three
ideological effect categories. Percentages indicate the percentage of observations
within each region; percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
The graphs produce two primary findings. First and foremost, the initiative
significantly increases the chance of policy adoption in 61% of the cases in our data.
In contrast, it significantly decreases the chance of adoption in just under 5% of the
cases. This ratio matches what we found in our previous figure, but by pooling, we
achieve a more precise estimate. It also shows that the effect of the initiative works in
the opposite direction for negative and positive policies among conservative and
liberal states, supporting our supposition that we might uncover no effect if we
estimated a single interaction among all the policies. This pattern of positive and
negative effects points to the second interesting finding: among ideological policies
the initiative tends to increase the chance of adoption when that chance is low or
moderate and decreases it only when it is relatively large. One might suspect that
functional form produces this feature, but additional analyses that allowed for nonlinear relationships recovered the same pattern. Among nonideological policies the effect
remains positive for all values of ideology. We return to this finding in our discussion.

Discussion and Conclusion
Our findings support theoretical arguments that the initiative process ought to have a
complex effect on policy adoption. It may increase, decrease, or have no effect on the
probability of adoption. The precise effect varies with the configuration of voter and
legislative preferences and with features of the initiative qualification process itself.
Because previous studies typically rely on a single policy or a small, coherent group of
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policies they have produced divergent findings. We have attempted to bring this
range of effects into a unified picture by modeling the initiative’s effect across
hundreds of policies. This allows us to capture the average effect and to let it vary
systematically across policies. Our analysis produces a few important findings.
First, we find evidence of a positive average effect over the last 40 years. This
represents an important starting point since the possible range of predicted consequences includes both positive and negative effects and empirical evidence for even a
single policy can produce different directions in different eras (Matsusaka 2004). Thus,
over a long time period, the initiative process appears to have increased state policy
innovativeness. And since policies tend to diffuse across states the presence of the
initiative process in one state will increase the chance of adoption in connected states
and will radiate further through those states’ connections. Yet high hurdles for ballot
qualification reduce and even eliminate this positive effect: our results show that states
with a distribution requirement or those without one that have a very large signature
requirement experience no net increase in the rate of policy adoption relative to
noninitiative states. Interest in such higher hurdles has grown in recent years. While
signature requirements see only small changes in our data (the national mean changes
by less than half of a percent), states have recently started increasing requirements to
make it more difficult to qualify initiatives. Just last year, the Maine legislature narrowly
failed to pass a constitutional amendment that would have created a new statewide
distribution requirement.17 In 2018, a bill was introduced in Oklahoma to require that
the statewide signature thresholds—currently 8% for statutory and 15% for constitutional measures—be met in every county.18 In contrast to these legislative efforts,
studies of the effect of the initiative process on policy, citizen participation, or public
opinion have tended to focus more on the signature effect alone. Our results indicate
both matter and distribution requirements perhaps more so.
Second, we find evidence of extensive heterogeneity across policies underlying this
positive average effect. We do so initially by estimating a multi-level model with a
random coefficient for the presence of the initiative process and find that the standard
deviation of this coefficient nearly matches its magnitude. Thus, the effect varies from
slightly negative to almost twice as large as the overall average across policies. Again, this
underscores the prediction that the consequences of the initiative process will vary across
policies and states based on their configuration of political preferences and fits with the
empirical evidence’s wide range of findings. These findings help explain the conflicting
findings on the role of the initiative and policy adoption and highlight the need for a
systematic test of the initiative across a large sample of policies and over time.19
Lastly, we find that the heterogeneity in the effect of the initiative process arises in
part through the conditioning of its effect via public preferences. Policy adoptions
reflect the general ideological proclivity of citizens in a state but the degree of
reflection will change in states with the initiative process since it makes it harder
for policymakers to maintain divergent policies. By varying the effect of preferences
by policy and by the presence of the initiative process we find that about 14% of
policies show an increased chance of adoption in initiative states while 4% show a
17

See Maine LD 31 (HP 32): http://legislature.maine.gov/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?ID=280062465.
See Oklahoma HB1603: http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/2017-18%20FLR/hflr/HB1603%
20HFLR.PDF.
19
We further investigate this heterogeneity by estimating separate models for social or economic policies.
Table 5 in LaCombe 2021 shows the results for sub-samples of social and economic policies.
18
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decreased chance. The increase tends to happen more with liberal preferences while
the decrease occurs more often for conservative preferences.
We attempt to better understand this pattern by partitioning policies into liberal,
nonpartisan, and conservative groupings based on the ideology of states most likely to
adopt them. This analysis reconfirms the generally positive effect of the initiative, but
reveals an intriguing pattern. For ideological policies the initiative process tends to
reduce the influence of ideology on adoption: states that are less likely to adopt
become more likely with the initiative whereas states that are more likely to adopt
become less so. For nonpartisan policies the effect is already flat; adding the initiative
produces a consistent increase in the probability of adoption for all values of ideology.
We find these results intriguing for two reasons. First, in the absence of ideological
effects the initiative appears to increase policy innovativeness. When public opinion
provides neither a push nor a check on a new policy, the initiative process makes it
more likely that a state will experiment and try the new policy. In some sense one can
think of this as a “pure” test of the effect of the initiative since it abstracts from its
theorized role of bringing policy into line with opinion (Gerber 1996; Leemann and
Wasserfallen 2016) thereby isolating its procedural function as one more way to
change policy. Second, on ideological policies the initiative has generally been
thought of as a way to more quickly translate favorable preferences into policy
change. Yet our results show that the initiative tends to produce greater uniformity
in policy adoptions across states than this would suggest by reducing the chance of
adoption for ideologically favorable states and increasing it for ideologically unfavorable states. Our data do not tell us whether the difference constitutes an improvement or a deterioration in representation but the result warrants further exploration,
both for its theoretical import and for its substantive policy implications for how the
initiative changes state policies.
Data Availability Statement. Replication materials are available on UNC Dataverse at https://doi.org/
10.15139/S3/2JN1IR.
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